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Analysis of financial
crisis in Asia
On October 8–10, 1998, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
cosponsored the conference Asia: An
Analysis of Financial Crisis. The confer-
ence served as a forum to discuss the
economic and financial turmoil in
East Asia that started with the devalua-
tion of the Thai baht on July 2, 1997,
and soon spread to other countries in
the region. More than 230 academics,
policymakers, and market participants
from the U.S. and 17 foreign countries
attended the three-day conference in
Chicago. This Chicago Fed Letter sum-
marizes the conference discussions,
which addressed the origins and effects
of the crisis in East Asia, the role of
the IMF in relation to this and other
crises, concerns about the regulatory
framework, research into early warning
indicators of financial crisis, the effects
of moral hazard, and lessons to be
learned from the crisis.
Origins of the crisis
Discussion on the origins of the crisis
revolved around two theories of finan-
cial crisis, one based on economic fun-
damentals and the other on financial
panic. The theory based on economic
fundamentals argues that weak domes-
tic macroeconomic factors (for exam-
ple, high fiscal deficits and rampant
inflation) precipitate a balance-of-pay-
ments crisis. A country under a fixed
exchange rate regime with weak mac-
roeconomic fundamentals becomes vul-
nerable to a speculative currency attack.
Defense against speculation drains
the troubled country’s foreign reserves,
and an economic crisis ensues.
In contrast, theories based on financial
panic attribute the crisis to an exoge-
nous change in investor confidence,
leading to liquidity problems. This
loss of confidence among investors
leads to a sudden withdrawal of short-
term capital from the troubled coun-
tries. In East Asia, this difficult situa-
tion was exacerbated by the highly
leveraged state of these economies,
which held a large amount of short-
term debt denominated in foreign
currencies. As capital flight led to se-
vere currency devaluation, it became
more difficult for these countries to
cover their foreign denominated lia-
bilities, and they plunged into finan-
cial crisis.
In deciding which theory best explains
the onset of the financial crisis in Asia,
one must reconcile a number of incon-
sistencies between theory and reality.
For example, many economic funda-
mentals in Asia were incompatible
with an impending crisis. Many Asian
economies were characterized by low
inflation, above-average GDP growth
(relative to 1990–94 levels), fiscal bud-
gets that appeared to be in balance or
surplus, and high rates of investment.
Inconsistencies also exist regarding
the applicability of financial panic
theories. The dramatic shift in inves-
tor confidence required by the theory
is unlikely to have been completely
exogenous. Economic fundamentals
must have played a role in investors’
minds. Furthermore, why did investors
suddenly experience a loss of confi-
dence? After all, investors knew the
economic status of these countries
well before the onset of the crisis.
Reuven Glick, Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco, argued that these
theories are not mutually exclusive
and that the ultimate cause of the cri-
sis may have been a mixture of both
economic fundamentals and financial
panic. However, the relevant weight
of each theory is important in the as-
sessment of the crisis. He and Profes-
sor Michael Dooley, Board of Governors
and the University of California at
Santa Cruz, concurred that understand-
ing the causes of the crisis is critical in
determining an effective response.
Should the source of the turmoil be
external factors, such as a financial
panic, it would be fairly straightfor-
ward for the international community
to design an appropriate response,
such as imposing capital controls and
other safeguards. However, if the crisis
was caused by faulty economic funda-
mentals, then finding solutions would
be more complicated as it would re-
quire political, cultural, and economic
reforms.
While the conference participants
did not reach a consensus on the exact
theory to explain the crisis, the various
theories they presented had many ele-
ments in common. These included:
poor governmental policies, banking
and corporate fragility, weak financial
infrastructure, presence of moral haz-
ard, lack of transparency with respect to
financial institutions, dependence on
short-term debt denominated in for-
eign currencies, and fixed exchange
regimes.
The role of the IMF in the crisis
The purpose, activities, and future of
the IMF were the subject of candid
discussions. Bijan Aghevli, deputy
director in the Asia and Pacific depart-
ment at the IMF, provided an overview
of the IMF’s response to the crisis.
Aghevli reminded the audience of the
sudden change in perception of the
Asian economic miracle. In the years
prior to the crisis, observers marveled
at the phenomenal economic growth
of the Asian “tigers.” The abundant
flow of foreign capital seemed to sup-
port the political, economic, and cul-
tural systems in these countries. How-
ever, as capital flows began to dry up
and these countries plunged into cri-
sis, public perception turned against
the Asian tigers and the IMF.
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in Asia has had many calling for reform
of the organization. The Asian crisis
has been a crucial test of the IMF’s
functions and, in the opinion of many,
the organization has been found want-
ing. Critics like Anna Schwartz, Nation-
al Bureau of Economic Research, and
Professor Allan Meltzer, Carnegie Mel-
lon University, argued that IMF poli-
cies are inconsistent with the current
global economy. The IMF was created
as part of the 1944 Bretton Woods
agreements, when major economies
were converting to a fixed exchange
rate regime. The IMF was given the
charge of maintaining fixed exchange
rates and providing loans to member
countries undergoing temporary cur-
rent account balance-of-payments
difficulties. After the collapse of the
Bretton Woods System in 1971, most
countries abandoned fixed exchange
rates and adopted a floating exchange
rate. Therefore, the role of the IMF to
maintain fixed exchange regimes has
arguably become obsolete.
Other critics questioned the appro-
priateness of the IMF’s actions during
the Asian crisis. Several observers
suggested that the IMF prematurely
rushed to extend funds to troubled
countries, rather than waiting to see if
funds could be acquired from private
financial markets. Such actions, some
argued, worsened the situation by
providing a signal that the IMF would
always come to these countries’ rescue.
The IMF was naive in its agreements
with Asian countries, some observers
said, as it released funds with few
guarantees that countries would com-
ply with its suggested reforms, and its
enforcement of such agreements was
especially weak. Rather than main-
taining a traditional role of lending,
the IMF has become involved in man-
dating structural reforms for borrow-
ing countries.
In addition to accusing the IMF of
prescribing ineffective and perhaps
inappropriate reforms, some in the
international community have ques-
tioned the IMF’s monetary policy rec-
ommendations to Asian economies.
Several observers argued that the IMF’s
policy recommendations and reforms
worsened the crisis. As a result, there
appears to be a growing belief that
the IMF must redefine its purpose and
policies to remain effective under con-
temporary economic conditions.
IMF response
In keynote addresses, Stanley Fischer,
managing director of the IMF, and
Karin Lissakers, executive director of
the United States at the IMF, acknowl-
edged the validity of many of the criti-
cisms aimed at the IMF and admitted
some signs of the pending crisis were
overlooked. While economic funda-
mentals in Asia showed promise (for
example, low inflation, fiscal balance
or surplus, and high levels of foreign
reserves), the speakers conceded that
many warning signs were ignored. For
example, the IMF should have noticed
that bank and corporate balance sheets
were weakening in Korea, where com-
panies were maintaining excessively
high debt to equity ratios, and that
current account deficits were increas-
ing rapidly.
However, both speakers argued that
the IMF was not always to blame in not
anticipating the crisis; the governments
of some of the countries involved also
withheld information from the IMF.
The IMF was unaware of these govern-
ments’ costly attempts to defend their
exchange rates, which soon depleted
the bulk of their foreign reserves. By
the time they turned to the IMF for
assistance, these economies had
reached a critical stage of vulnerabili-
ty. The nature of these countries’
hedging of currency risk was also hid-
den from the IMF.  Such strategies to
offset risk, including volatile deriva-
tives and other instruments, are very
difficult to monitor because they are
off-balance-sheet transactions.  Prior
to the crisis, there was hedging of cur-
rency risk with Asian and Russian finan-
cial institutions unprotected from
currency risk. The collapse of these
unhedged counterparties during the
crisis worsened the financial conta-
gion. Lissakers attributed a large por-
tion of the crisis to derivatives, calling
them the “black hole of this crisis.”
Fischer and Lissakers defended the
early IMF recommendation to tighten
fiscal policy in Asian economies. Tight
fiscal policy was a consistent response
to an “overheated” economy. As such
fears became unwarranted, the IMF
abandoned those recommendations
in favor of a looser fiscal stance. Urg-
ing Asian countries to adopt a restric-
tive monetary policy was also contro-
versial. Many believed abandoning the
defense of national currencies was the
better policy, as high interest rates can
often impose serious damage on the
real economy. The IMF had a difficult
choice in making its monetary policy
recommendations. Easy monetary poli-
cy would encourage consumer spend-
ing and borrowing but would lead to a
further devaluation of the currency.
On the other hand,  restrictive mone-
tary policy would have the effect of
driving up interest rates, thereby pro-
tecting the value of the currency. Such
high interest rates would, however,
discourage borrowing and spending
and exacerbate the economic situa-
tion. The IMF believed that restrictive
monetary policy was the better option
during a currency crisis. An increase
in domestic interest rates made the
currency more desirable and penal-
ized speculation. High interest rates
would not seriously damage the econ-
omy, if the period were brief enough.
The true downfall of the policy, how-
ever, was its inconsistency. Asian gov-
ernments confused the international
community by pursuing erratic mone-
tary policy, which undermined its ef-
fectiveness. In any event, the debate
was largely academic, because, regard-
less of which policy decision was
made, either shock would have dam-
aged the Asian economies in their
fragile state.
Future of the IMF
Conference participants offered
many proposals for changing the role
of the IMF. Some argued that the IMF
should encourage flexible exchange
rates for member countries, because
such rates protect against contagious
currency depreciation and other ex-
ternal shocks, and that it should adopt
stricter policies in its lending to mem-
ber countries. Others proposed that
membership of the IMF should be
more exclusive and that countries
should satisfy certain economic re-
quirements before they become eligi-
ble for IMF lending. Furthermore,
the IMF should lend only on a collat-
eralized basis at a penalty rate to dis-
courage dependency. Exclusivity andMichael H. Moskow, President; William C. Hunter,
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the imposition of a penalty rate would
reduce moral hazard and encourage
structural reforms. Countries would
emphasize prevention, rather than
dependence with respect to IMF as-
sistance. In lieu of direct lending, the
IMF could facilitate lending arrange-
ments between illiquid economies
and private financial markets. Such
an approach will be necessary as the
IMF lacks both the funds and the char-
acteristics to be a lender of last resort
for the international community.
Strengthening the regulatory
framework
Tom de Swaan, past chairman of the
Basle Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion, described the weaknesses in the
regulatory framework in Asia that con-
tributed to the crisis. De Swaan called
for effective banking supervision and
identified the following five precon-
ditions: sound and sustainable macro-
economic policies, a well-developed
public infrastructure, effective market
discipline, procedures for efficient
resolution of problems at banks, and
mechanisms for providing an appro-
priate level of systemic protection.
Stable macroeconomic policy is a pre-
requisite for stability in the financial
system. An efficient infrastructure,
such as a well-defined legal system
and consistent accounting standards,
facilitates supervision. Effective mar-
ket discipline is necessary to provide
internal and external incentives to
properly manage risk. Established
procedures to resolve failing financial
institutions insure an efficient finan-
cial system. Finally, systemic protection
or a safety net in the form of deposit
insurance restricts bank runs, which
could introduce instability in the finan-
cial system.
While many conference participants
agreed with the weaknesses of the
regulatory environment in East Asia,
some observers proposed alternative
reforms to strengthen the framework.
Professor George Benston, Emory
University, and Meltzer argued that,
while supervision and regulation may
reduce the risks of future crisis, market-
based reforms would be more effec-
tive. They also argued that the entry
of foreign banks is essential to provid-
ing stability to the financial system.
These banks would provide diversifi-
cation and competition, which would
encourage efficiency in the financial
sector. Benston also recommended a
switch from heavy-handed regulation
to a market-driven approach. He
stressed that such monitoring could
be achieved by requiring banks to is-
sue subordinated debt, which is jun-
ior in its claim on assets. When a
bank becomes insolvent, subordinat-
ed debt holders of that bank could
lose their entire investment. This
creates a strong incentive for debt
holders to monitor their banks, thus
discouraging risky behavior. These
initiatives would encourage effective
market discipline and would be easi-
er to implement than comprehen-
sive structural reforms, which may
have to overcome political and cul-
tural barriers. While such market
reforms drew support from many
conference participants, some raised
concerns about the ability of markets
to alleviate the financial turmoil in
Asia. As Carl Lindgren of the IMF
lamented, “When we need markets
the most, they work the least.”
Robert Johnson, former investment
manager at Moore Capital Manage-
ment, addressed similar market con-
cerns. Economic theory establishes
that free markets are the best solution,
but given the damage caused by the
volatility of capital markets, Johnson
argued that a retreat by certain Asian
countries from financial liberaliza-
tion toward restrictive capital controls
may be the best choice in the current
situation. Although such policies
may stabilize these economies in the
short term, they could inhibit eco-
nomic growth if allowed to persist,
longer term. Conference participants
agreed on the need for alternative
strategies to protect against the vola-
tility of free capital markets while fos-
tering economic growth.
Early warning indicators
Graciela Kaminsky, George Wash-
ington University; Morris Goldstein,
Institute of International Economics;
Jerome Fons, Moody’s Investor’s Ser-
vice; and John Wing, Illinois Insti-
tute of Technology and ABN AMRO,
discussed ongoing research on iden-
tifying new early warning indicators.
This research is important because
most current indicators, such as inter-
est rate spreads and credit ratings,
have been relatively ineffective in pre-
dicting crises. The greatest impediment
to developing effective indicators is
the current lack of transparency within
financial systems in Asia. Poor account-
ing practices and delayed or incom-
plete financial reporting represent
obstacles to accurate and timely analysis
of these countries’ economic health.
The low quality of financial information
creates the problem of “garbage in, gar-
bage out” in sophisticated models that
attempt to determine financial risk.
However, transparency within the finan-
cial system would not solve all of the
problems. Eric Rosengren, Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, pointed out
that perfect knowledge of the workings
of a financial system does not eliminate
its faults. Several political and cultural
barriers exist within Asian financial
markets, and these barriers are largely
responsible for the economic turmoil.
Comprehensive reforms will have to
take place before the benefits of trans-
parency will bear fruit. Proponents of
early warning indicators conceded that
their work is at an early stage, but they
believe it is useful in providing some
warning of financial crisis. Critics ac-
knowledged the importance of con-
tinuing research in this area, but were
skeptical of the usefulness of such in-



















































































































































































































































Presence of moral hazard
Another topic of discussion at the con-
ference was the role of moral hazard
in precipitating the crisis. Moral haz-
ard added to the crisis in two distinct
ways. One focuses on the role of moral
hazard within Asian financial markets
and the other on the role of the IMF.
Many conference participants ex-
pressed concern about the implicit
government guarantees given to or
perceived by investors in Asian finan-
cial markets. Such conditions encour-
aged risky behavior by financial insti-
tutions. Bank managers perceived no
downside risk, because they received
high rates of interest in good times
and expected the government to bail
them out in bad times. Market disci-
pline suffered due to a lack of proper
incentives. Charles Calomiris, Colum-
bia University, agreed with Benston
that subordinated debt requirements
could reduce the moral hazard prob-
lem by inducing intensified monitor-
ing by market participants.
With regard to the IMF’s role, some
observers argued that the mere exist-
ence of the IMF encouraged risky na-
tional policies. Individual countries
may tend to conduct such policies
because they believe they can rely on
assistance from the IMF in the event
of a crisis. Michael Mussa, director of
research at the IMF, acknowledged
that the IMF’s rescue programs intro-
duce disincentives but presented two
convincing alternative views. First, he
pointed out that the damage experi-
enced by a nation in financial crisis is
so comprehensive that the IMF’s pro-
grams could not offer enough protec-
tion to encourage a nation to willingly
court a crisis. Second, the damage
caused by the presence of moral haz-
ard is outweighed by the benefits of
international stability gained through
international rescue programs.
Lessons from the crisis
Despite the lively debate at the con-
ference, by the end most participants
agreed on a number of issues. The
financial turmoil in Asia is ongoing
and its impact is more severe than
originally thought. Countervailing
factors served to obscure the origins
of the crisis. Although signs of weak-
ness were apparent, such as high cur-
rent account deficits, high debt lever-
aging, and fragility within the bank-
ing and corporate sectors, other sig-
nals, such as low inflation and high
savings rates, pointed to economic
good health. Although it is difficult to
determine the exact causes of the de-
bacle and the order of their signifi-
cance, conference participants drew
up a list of likely candidates. Among
them were weak economic fundamen-
tals, financial panic, poor governmen-
tal policies, banking and corporate
fragility, weak financial infrastructure,
moral hazard, lack of transparency,
dependence on short-term debt, and
fixed exchange regimes.
Lessons from the Asian financial crisis
may permit the development of effec-
tive responses to future crises. Coun-
tries will be less likely or less able to
become dependent on foreign capi-
tal inflows to finance their debt. Reli-
ance on fixed exchange rate regimes
will be discouraged, given their vulner-
ability to speculation and contagion.
Structural reforms will require a great
deal of effort, sacrifice, and time. Such
reforms must address the problems of
fragility. Reforms will not be restricted
to Asian countries; as a result of the
crisis, the IMF is likely to adopt several
structural and procedural changes to
increase its effectiveness in the future.
Overall, the conference was success-
ful in bringing together different
views on the financial turmoil in Asia,
clarifying the issues, and advancing
the search for means of prevention or




Proceedings of the conference will be
published early in 1999. For more
information, contact Ella Dukes in
the Economic Research Department of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,
telephone (312) 322-5757 or email
Ella.Dukes@chi.frb.org.